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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to share the SRS methodology for identifying the reliability 
requirements and documenting the expected performance of Safety Instrumented Functions 
(SIFs) used as criticality defenses.  Nuclear Criticality SIFs are comprised of sensors, logic 
solvers, and final control elements, which may be either automatic or manual, to detect a process 
hazard and respond to prevent a criticality. 
 
The Savannah River Site (SRS) has invoked the chemical process industry safety standard 
(ANSI/ISA 84.00.01)1 for the design of safety significant instrumented systems.  The ISA 
standard provides a graded approach to design based on the amount of risk reduction that is 
required of an SIF.  SRS is embarking on application of this standard to nuclear criticality 
defenses, thus integrating criticality safety requirements with verifiable design methodology.  Per 
the DOE G 421.1-12 discussion of the double contingency principle, guidance for a single 
contingency barrier includes, “The estimated probability that the control will fail (when called 
upon for protection) is not greater than 1 in 100 demands.”   
 
The application of this standard to nuclear criticality SIFs will provide clear requirements in 
terms of safety availability and testing to assure that the instrumented criticality system as 
designed, installed, and maintained will meet is performance requirements.  The paper identifies 
the numerous challenges presented by this initiative and the benefits of this approach. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically when a nuclear criticality SIF had been used as an active-engineered nuclear 
criticality barrier, it was designed using equipment procured under a QA program and installed 
in a fail-safe configuration.  In most cases the safety instrumented function was configured as a 
simplex system.  That is there was no redundancy of instruments or final devices that placed the 
process in a shutdown or safe condition.  The instrumented system may have been implemented 
by separate, hardwired components, or in some cases they were included as part of the basic 
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process control system that functioned as the non-safety hardware platform for the process.  
Although these systems were judged to be reliable, there was no requirement to quantitatively 
estimate the system unavailability.  These practices have supported the SRS record of ZERO 
inadvertent criticalities over 50+ years of handling fissile materials.    
The Savannah River Site (SRS) has now adopted a safety design standard, which is used for the 
design and management of safety systems by the process industry, for the design of Nuclear 
Criticality Safety Significant Instrumented Functions.   ANSI/ISA S84.01-19963 and its 
successor ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004, Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the 
Process Industry Sector1, have been in use at SRS since 1999 for the design of instrumented 
systems classified as Safety Significant (SS), but not until 2007 has the ISA standard been 
applied to Nuclear Criticality Safety Significant Instrumented Functions.  The application of the 
ISA Functional Safety design standard is intended to augment our safety posture rather than 
replace any ANS or DOE requirement for (1) the assessment for the need for an active-
engineered criticality defense, or (2) the required safety unavailability of the SIF. 
 
 
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY CODE REQUIREMENTS and GUIDANCE 
 
ANSI/ANS 8.1-1998, Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Material Outside 
Reactors4, Section 4.2.2 has a requirement for a Double Contingency Principle.  It states that, 
“Process designs should incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require at least two unlikely, 
independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is 
possible.”  Within the standard it does not further define the term ‘Unlikely’ with respect to a 
safety unavailability or probability of failure on demand.  
DOE G 421.1-1, Criticality Safety Good Practices Program Guide for DOE Nonreactor Nuclear 
Facilities2, does provide some guidance on when a barrier (One arm of a double contingency) is 
sufficiently unlikely to fail in terms of unavailability.  Section 5.7.7.3.1, Guideline 1, provides a 
failure limit of no greater than 1 in 100 demands to qualify the barrier for application to the 
Double Contingency Principle.  To put this reliability requirement in perspective, the Guide also 
states in 5.7.7.1, “While failure mode independence can be established, likelihood of failure 
cannot be well quantified ...” indicating that principal reliance is placed on the independence of 
barriers. 
There are three basic means of control to prevent a criticality; (1) passive-engineered control, (2) 
active-engineered control, and (3) administrative control.  A Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) 
is classified as an active-engineered control.  A SIF is composed of instrument(s) that monitor 
critical process parameters, logic solver(s) that determine when a safety limit is exceeded, and 
final device(s) that place a process in a safe condition.  Alarms systems used solely to evacuate 
personnel, such as a Nuclear Incident Monitor (NIM), are not considered to be SIFs since they 
don’t actively place a process in a safe state.  ANSI/ANS 8.3, Criticality Accident Alarm 
System5, is the governing standard for the design of these types of systems.  Any criticality alarm 
or instrumentation system that does not have a safety function to actively prevent a criticality is 
not considered a SIF and is not covered by the ANSI/ISA 84.00.011 design process discussed 
below. 
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ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 
 
ISA 84.00.011 is a process industry (e.g. chemical, refinery) standard for the design, installation, 
operation, maintenance, start-up, periodic functional testing, and management of safety 
instrumented systems.  The standard promotes a risk-informed performance-based methodology 
for the life cycle management of safety systems.  It provides a graded approach to design based 
on the risk reduction required for a particular Safety Instrumented Function.  The amount of risk 
reduction required is not dictated by the standard, but is determined by the facility owner.  Risk 
is a function of the frequency of occurrence of a hazardous event and the consequence of that 
event.  Once the amount of risk reduction for a SIF is determined, the standard provides the 
design requirements and safety management required to meet and maintain the safety design. 
The standard has four Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) which are used to provide the graded 
approach.  The SILs are defined in terms of the average probability of failure on demand 
(PFDavg) or in other terms, the risk reduction factor (RRF), that the SIL provides as indicated 
below: 
· SIL-1 RRF of 10 to 100 PFDavg 10-1 to 10-2 
· SIL-2 RRF of 100 to 1,000 PFDavg 10-2 to 10-3 
· SIL-3 RRF of 1000 to 10,000 PFDavg 10-3 to 10-4 
· SIL-4 RRF of 10,000 to 100,000 PFDavg 10-4 to 10-5 
 
The calculation of the safety unavailability (probability of failure on demand) of an instrumented 
system is much different than that for a structural or mechanical system.   The simplified formula 
for calculating the PFDavg of a simplex SIS (no redundancy of components) is as shown below: 
 PFDavg = λ (TI/2)  
λ is the dangerous failure rate of the component 
TI is the test interval between periodic functional tests of the system 
When calculating the PFDavg for redundant systems common cause failure must be taken into 
account.  The equations can become more complex if other factors that would affect the PFDavg 
are considered such as diagnostic coverage and safe failure fraction.   
 
 
SIL DETERMINATION 
 
The ISA standard does not dictate the SIL value that has to be applied to a SIF in any given 
situation.  The assignment of a SIL for a particular SIF is left up to the facility owner based on 
the risk tolerance of that owner.  As an example, the location of identical process facilities in 
relation to environmental or population concerns will drive the acceptable risk of an accident 
based on the ultimate consequence.   
 As noted above, DOE G 421.1-12 provides guidance on the safety availability of a nuclear 
criticality barrier.  Its requirement for a failure on demand of no more than 1 in a 100, converts to 
a SIL-2.  As noted above, the DOE Guide provides a minimum goal for the probability of failure 
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on demand regardless of any qualitative or quantitative assessment of the frequency of a 
criticality event. 
The Savannah River Site (SRS) has adopted an in-house standard for Nuclear Criticality SIL 
determination.  SRS Engineering Standard 017036, Application of ISA 84.00.01- Part 1 for SRS 
non-Reactor Facilities, for the design of all Safety Significant Instrumented Systems, which 
includes nuclear criticality instrumented systems.  The standard includes the following statements 
for the SIL determination: 
“Per the DOE G 421.1-12 discussion of the double contingency principle, guidance for a 
single contingency barrier includes: 5.7.7.3.1 Guideline 1: The estimated probability that 
the control will fail (when called upon for protection) is not greater than 1 in 100 
demands.  The DOE guidance is applied regardless of functional classification.  To 
envelope this performance, an instrumented system should be designed as SIL-2.  A SIL-
2 SIF is defined as possessing an average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) of 
0.01 to 0.001 (RRF = 100 to 1000).   
 
Criticality Engineering may designate a higher or lower reliability requirement for a 
specific SIF, based on the strength of the other credited criticality controls and the degree 
of independence between the SIF and those credited controls.   
 
Application of the life cycle, structure, calculation methodology, and design philosophy 
presented in ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-20041 is appropriate for criticality safety instrumented 
functions with a functional classification of Production Support (PS) or General Services 
(GS-C).  Requirement 9.4.2 of ISA 84.00.01 limits the risk reduction factor for a system 
implemented in a BPCS (Basic Process Control System – usually the DCS).  The risk 
reduction factor, for a PS or GS-C function implemented within a Distributed Control 
System (DCS) or other non-safety system, is limited to 10 by requirement 9.4.2.” 
The provision allowing Criticality Engineering to designate a higher or lower reliability 
requirement recognizes that the application of ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-20041 will yield a 
safety function whose reliability is well quantified; adjustment of the reliability target 
may be appropriate in light of this reduced uncertainty.  
 
The discussion of non-SS criticality protections, in the last paragraph, emphasizes that 
ISA 84.00.011 sets a maximum allowable credit for protections implemented in the 
BPCS, which is non-safety.  If protections, which were previously implemented as 
independent, distinct hardware elements, are migrated to DCS system, the risk reduction 
provided by those functions must be determined in light of this standard.  
 
  LWO-RSS-2007-00025 
  
 5 
DESIGN INPUT 
 
Merely defining that the design must meet the requirements of ISA 84.00.01-20041 is 
insufficient.  The implementation of the ISA standards requires a team approach.  At a minimum, 
the team should include nuclear criticality engineering, design engineering and design authority 
engineering.  At least one member of the team should be an expert on the application of the ISA 
standard.  A safety requirements specification for the SIF must be developed that includes items 
listed below: 
· Identification of the safety function.  Define the safe state of the process.  The complete 
description of the safety function should be provided including requirements such as 
the maximum allowed shutoff valve leakage.  If the safe state involves sequencing, then 
the required sequencing should be identified. 
· Required modes of operation 
· The target SIL of the SIF  
· The required operating range and analytical safety limit of the system should be 
specified.  
· The response time required of the system, including time for operator action, from the 
detection of a hazardous event to the completion of the final control element action 
should be specified. 
· Environmental/seismic/fire/NPH design requirements 
· Desired system functional test interval 
· Maximum acceptable nuisance/spurious trip rate 
· Need for bypasses, manual trip or reset action by operator should be identified. 
 
 
FACTORS THAT AFFECT SIL VERIFICATION 
 
The following factors affect the verification of the PFDavg achieved by a design and its 
operation: 
· Fail-safe design 
· Equipment reliability 
· Component/system redundancy 
· Common cause failure fraction for redundant components 
· Fault tolerance 
· Diagnostic coverage of component/system failures 
· Functional test interval 
· Reliability of support systems 
· Operator reliability 
· Technology used (i.e. switch, analog sensor, or smart sensor) 
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DESIGN APPLICATION 
 
The target SIL assigned to the SIF is the major driver for the architecture of the SIS.  A SIL-1 
system can be implemented with a simplex design.  That is, for an automatic SIL-1 SIF it will 
normally require only one sensor, a logic device (i.e. relays, certified PLC), and a final element 
(i.e. valve, breaker).  Figures 1 through 3 provide comparative examples of SIL designs that 
achieve the same function to shutdown a feed into a tank.  The SIL-3 SIS design provides 100 
times the RRF of a SIL-1 SIS design.  The examples assume the same failure rate for common 
components and the same periodic test frequencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1 – SIL-1 Feed Blending. 
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Figure 2 – SIL-2 Feed Blending. 
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Figure 3 – SIL-3 Feed Blending. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
ISA 84.00.011 provides a structured verifiable approach to design and maintain the probability of 
failure on demand limits established by DOE for nuclear criticality systems.  The ISA Standard’s 
methodology for providing a graded approach to the life cycle design of safety instrumented 
systems is recognized by the process industries both nationally and internationally.  It provides a 
methodology to design a SIF to meet safety unavailability goals and the reliability of the SIF 
design over the life of the facility.  Correct implementation the methodology requires a team 
approach between DSA preparers, the design authority, and the design agency.  The team must 
include expertise in the ISA Standard.   
The benefits of the ISA 84.00.011 process are clear understandable design requirements, and 
operation and maintenance requirements that provide the required risk reduction to meet ANS 
and DOE standards.  The final SIF design is defensible; the reliability and effectiveness of the 
SIF is well quantified.  Recognizing this increased assurance about the active-engineered 
criticality barrier, the Criticality Engineer has a new opportunity to optimize the set of barriers 
selected to prevent inadvertent criticality. 
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